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CEO Characteristics and Financial Restatement: The Case of 
CEO Turnover in Malaysia 
Rokiah Ishak, Mohd „Atef Md. Yusof, Noor Afza Amran & Norhani Aripin1# 
This study examines the incidence of financial restatement in CEO 
turnover firms. Using logistic regression model on 78 CEO turnover 
firms from 2008 to 2010 among nonfinancial institution, we find that 
the age of the CEO and forced turnover influence restatement in the 
year prior to CEO turnover. Specifically, older CEOs have higher 
probability of restating financial statement as they may wish to hold to 
the last bonus/pay they would likely receive. We also document some 
evidence of management entrenchment hypothesis that CEO 
ownership may lower financial restatement. Firm characteristics such 
as size, Big 4 and growth as measure by market to book value have a 
positive relationship with restatement which suggests that big 
companies with  high growth have higher probability of restatement. 
The study also supports the argument of debt as a monitoring cost as 
debt is argued to constraint opportunistic earnings management 
behavior including restatement.  
 




Financial restatement happens after a non-restated financial statement had been 
released and consumed by the market. This would distort shareholder‟s wealth and 
would be less forthcoming especially if it is speculated to conceal bad performance. 
Abdullah, Md Yusof and Mohamad Nor (2010) documented that almost 40 percent of 
their sample restated the cost or expenses and about 17 percent restated revenue 
recognition in their 2002-2005 samples which were in the pre Malaysian Financial 
Reporting Standard (MFRS) regime. As such, from political economy perspective, 
accounting information serves many functions including preempting criticisms from 
shareholders especially after bad performance. Consequently, the top management has 
the incentives to choose or change accounting policies to camouflage the real 
performance and as such would resort to “buying time” tactic. In such dire situation, the 
CEOs would choose accounting policies that would paint favorable condition in a 
particular year but would lead to restatement in the following year. However, it could be 
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argued that such tactics would invariably results in CEO‟s turnover sooner or later as 
the shareholders may put the blame to the incumbent CEOs. 
 
Few companies on Bursa Malaysia including BinaDarulAman and NWP Holdings 
change their CEOs shortly after financial restatements seemed to suggest that financial 
restatement and CEO turnover are associated although these are anecdotal. 
Empirically, Land (2010) finds that her US samples from 1996 to 1999 changed the 
CEOs within a year of financial restatement. This is similar to Hennes et al. (2008) that 
find about 50% of the sample changed the CEOs in two years after financial 
restatement. However, Land (2010) does not discriminate types of CEO turnover, 
namely forced turnover or voluntary turnover and how such classifications affect the 
relationship of restatement and CEO turnover. This issue would improve the current 
model of CEO turnover and financial restatement if the nature of turnover is investigated 
separately. Moreover, ownership structure especially of management would increase 
management entrenchment that would make a proposal to remove the CEO to be more 
difficult. Long serving CEO is also argued to have additional influence on the board 
since the CEO could be seen as part of the corporate image both from insiders and 
outsiders. 
 
Following the above argument, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether CEO 
characteristic and CEO turnover type influence company‟s financial restatement. Based 
on 78 CEO turnover companies, this study finds that CEO age, firm size, growth and 
Big 4 have a positive relationship with restatement. These findings indicate that older 
CEO, large firms and firms that audited by Big 4 are more likely involved with 
restatement. In contrast, leverage and CEOs forced turnover have a negative 
association with restatement which suggest that firms with high debt to equity ratio and 
terminated their CEO are less likely restated their financial statements. 
 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior studies and develop the 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research method and Section 4 presents the 
results and discussions. Section 5 provides the conclusion. 
 
 
2.0 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
The hypotheses development of this study is primarily based on the agency theory 
framework which is concerned about the separation of powers between principals and 
agents. This theory assumes that the agent will act in the best interest of the owners. 
Human capital theory and social network theory are also used as complementary 
theories to agency theory.  
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2.1 Financial Restatement and CEO Turnover 
An earnings restatement occurs through two main occurrences, the discovery of an 
error in previous periods or a change in accounting method. There are many different 
types of errors that can cause earnings to be restated by a company. They can range 
from a simple bookkeeping error all the way to fraud by the management of the 
company. Errors or misjudgments are the most publicized causes of restating earnings, 
and if one were to simply follow the headlines in newspapers it would seem that they 
were the only cause of earnings restatements. However, a company may restate 
earnings simply because they are changing to another accepted accounting principle. 
This was the case with Kmart recently restating their earnings (Merrick, 2002). 
 
Previous studies for example Land (2010) and Hennes et al. (2008) find an association 
between CEO turnover and financial restatement. Their studies reveal that companies 
have intention to change their CEOs within a year of restatement announcement while 
another 50% of their sample firms change the CEO in two years after restatement. The 
theoretical background for CEO turnover stems from research on executive 
compensation and firm performance using principal-agent theory. In general, turnover is 
defined as a rate at which people leave employment (Cascio, 2002). Turnover rate 
usually rises during economic expansions and fall during recession, in an inverse 
proportion to the unemployment rate. Branham (2000) claimed that many companies 
are more concerned with the turnover rate being too low rather than too high. The 
reason is because higher turnover rates will introduce new talents and cost savings 
through resetting salaries and other measures. In some cases, management must 
replace old skill sets with the new ones as technology or the customer base changes, or 
for a different demographic mix or a better distribution of age groups. In order to 
facilitate these requirements, some companies are now moving towards semi-annually  
or even quarterly reviews to speed up the process of terminating low performers who 
are unable to meet the new requirements of the companies. 
 
2.2 Financial Restatement and CEO Characteristics 
Human capital theory and social network theory suggest that CEOs gain their power 
through their educational background, skill and functional background, special 
expertise, experience, industry specialization, prestige, ownership, age and longer 
tenure (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). Power is defined as the 
capacity of individuals to exert their will (Datta & Guthrie, 1994).  Dominant CEOs tend 
to restrict the flow of information in highly velocious environments. They may restrict the 
flow of information by abolishing the contribution of a member of less power (Haleblian 
& Finkelstein, 1993).  
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2.2.1 CEO Age (CEOAGE) 
Demographic characteristics such as age and tenure are commonly used to determine 
the effectiveness in managing the firms. With regard to the age of directors, the 
Companies Act 1965 prohibits the appointment of a person of or over the age of 70 
years as a director of a public company or subsidiary of a public company. The office of 
a director shall become vacant until the forthcoming annual general meeting after he 
attains the age of 70 years. If the vacancy is not filled at the meeting, it may be filled as 
a casual vacancy. In addition, Kang (2002) claims that there is a provision in the 
company‟s articles regarding the retirement by rotation of directors so as to afford the 
shareholders of the company the opportunity to review the director‟s performance. For 
listed companies, the election of directors is to take place every year; and for all 
directors including the managing directors, they need to retire at least once in every 
three years but they are eligible for re-election.  
Some studies suggest that CEO with little experience have limited effectiveness 
because it takes time to gain an adequate understanding of the company. For example 
in CEO turnover study, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), split their sample into two 
categories; CEOs aged less than 54 years and CEOs of at least 54 years of age. The 
54 years figure is used as a split point since the retirement age of directors in the US 
companies is 55 years old. They find that in the young CEO sample (less than 54 years) 
where mandatory retirement has no influence, the inverse relation between stock price 
performance and probability of turnover is highly significant.  In the old CEO sample (54 
years or more), the relationship between performance and turnover becomes positive 
but insignificant. In contrast, Goyal and Park (2002) find that the coefficient on CEO age 
and the dummy for CEO ages of 53 to 55 are both positive and statistically significant at 
less than 1 percent level. Similarly, Barro and Barro (1990) who study on the turnover of 
banks‟ CEOs, find that the age of the CEO has a significant effect on the turnover 
decision. They state that the probability of departure falls until the age of 52 and then 
rises drastically around the ordinary retirement age of 55. Moreover, Lausten (2002) 
finds that young CEOs are assessed on the basis of increasing profit alone, while older 
CEOs are assessed based on both profit and the annual sales. In addition he also finds 
that young CEO (age less than 50 years) is more likely to be dismissed than older CEO 
(age more than 50 years).     
Besides, age can also be used as a proxy for CEO‟s knowledge. It is commonly stated 
that young CEOs are less experienced, therefore they have lower information level 
about the internal and external environment of the firm. For example, Lausten (2002) 
finds that the turnover-performance relationship for younger CEOs is based on the pre-
tax accounting profits for the preceding years, whereas the relationship for older CEOs 
is concentrated on the proportion of the pre-tax accounting profits to the annual sales in 
the firms. This result suggests that young CEOs are assessed on the basis of 
increasing profit alone, whereas better results including both the profit and the annual 
sales are requested from the older CEOs. 
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As the age is use as proxy of effectiveness, these studies suggest that the older, the 
greater the understanding of the firm and its industry, and the better the performance of 
the firm. If older, more experienced CEOs enhance firm performance, they might also 
be associated with lower use of financial restatement. 
 
 H1:   Firms with older   CEOs will be   less likely   involved   with   financial                             
                  restatement. 
 
 
2.2.2 CEO Tenure (CEOTENURE) 
Social network theory claims that CEOs would establish a power base over time. Shen 
and Cannella (2002) suggest that new CEOs confront significant challenges upon taking 
office. They need to adjust to their new roles and quickly develop good working 
relationship with other members of their top management groups, board of directors and 
powerful outside stakeholders. As time passes by and once incumbent CEOs have 
proven their leadership capacity and established their authority in office, the challenges 
would then be greatly reduced. Thus, it is expected that the longer a CEO has been in 
the firm, the less likely he is to be turned over unless he reaches the retirement age. For 
example, study in CEO turnover Goyal and Park (2002) include tenure as a control 
variable in their study and found that the estimated coefficient on the CEO tenure is 
negative and significant. This result suggests that the probability of CEO turnover is less 
likely  to occur when CEOs have longer tenure. A similar finding was derived from a 
study by Shen and Cannella (2002) who found that CEOs with shorter tenure are more 
likely to be dismissed than CEOs with a longer tenure.  
 
As the CEO tenure is use as proxy of effectiveness, the longer the tenure of the firm‟s 
CEO, the greater the understanding of the firm and its industry, and the better the 
performance of the firm. CEO with longer tenure is expected to have more experience 
that enhances firm performance. The higher the performance of the company, the lower 
the incidence of financial restatements although, Dechow and Sloan (1991) prove that 
there is a possibility that CEOs in their final years of service are more prone to manage 
reported short-term earnings. 
H2:   Firms with longer tenure CEOs will be less likely involved with   
        financial restatement    
      
 
2.2.3 CEO Ownership (CEOOWN) 
 
Agency theory discusses that there will be a convergence of interest between agent and 
principal. One way to solve this problem and to make the top management‟s interest 
aligns with shareholders‟ interest is by allowing the top management to have some 
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shares in the company. As the management owns some portion of company‟s share, 
they are now becoming the owners of the firms. As a result, they will put in their best 
efforts to enhance the firm‟s performance in order to maximize their own wealth.  
The proportion of shares owned by CEO will increase the power of CEO. Similar to 
managerial ownership, CEO ownership will increase a firm‟s value due to better 
alignment of interests between CEO and outside shareholders. Denis et al. (1997) 
propose two ways in which the equity ownership can protect CEO from internal 
monitoring efforts by both board and shareholders. First, CEO ownership is likely to be 
associated with the power of CEO, either through the voting control associated with 
equity ownership or through the correlation between equity ownership and other 
conditions conducive to managerial entrenchment or both. Second, CEO ownership 
may inhibit the external corporate control, thus reducing the effectiveness of internal 
control effort. As a result, it may reduce the likelihood of financial restatement poorly 
performing firms with high CEO ownership.  
Empirical evidences showed that managerial ownership is effective at certain ownership 
level (Morck et al. 1988; Denis et al. 1997). Studies by Morck et al. (1988) and Pergola 
(2005) found a curvilinear relationship between firm‟s value and the number of shares 
owned by management. They reported an increment in firm value when managerial 
ownership is between 0 percent to 5 percent and above 25 percent respectively. 
However, when the managerial ownership is between 5 percent to 25 percent, there is a 
decrement in firm‟s value. A similar finding is also discussed by Ghosh et al. (2007) who 
provides evidence that the controlling power of a CEO over firms‟ decision depends of 
the level on ownership possessed by the CEO. If the controlling power is less than 5 
percent, their influence is not significant and as the controlling power is more than 25 
percent, their power will be significantly increased .These findings are consistent with 
the management entrenchment hypothesis as the hypothesis posits that when 
management ownership level increases beyond a certain level, the manager‟s interest 
is aligned with the shareholders‟ interest because at this level the manager is also the 
owner of the firm. Thus, in the case of higher CEO ownership, the probability of financial 
restatement also declines as the interest of shareholders and CEO has been aligned. 
H3:     Firms with CEOs’ ownership will be less likely involved with    
                      financial restatement. 
 
 
2.2.4 CEO Turnover Type (FORCED) 
Furtado and Karan (1990) argue that different type of turnover will have different impact 
on the post-succession performance which normally refers to the stock market reaction.  
In general, several studies like Friedman and Singh (1989) and Davidson et al. (2006), 
report insignificant aggregate price effects for their overall sample, but significant 
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positive or negative effects for specific types of changes. Previous research classify 
turnover into two categories which are voluntary turnover and forced turnover.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that voluntary turnover is unlikely to be related to 
performance. Therefore, in order to reduce additional noise in dependent variable, they 
suggest that CEO turnover need to be separated between forced and voluntary 
turnover. Voluntary turnover is defined as changes due to the age of directors who are 
between 54-55 years, death or illness or changes in CEO due to merger and takeover 
(Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Denis et al. 1997; Maury, 2006). The voluntary turnover is 
normally planned; thus, it does not convey a significant effect on the firm‟s abnormal 
return. Normal retirement is an example of anticipated changes whereby CEOs 
announce their intentions to step down from their position at some future date. As the 
change is planned, the successor had already been determined and groomed within the 
firm. As claimed by Friedman and Singh (1989), customary retirements in generally are 
orderly smooth transitions that involve successors who are well known to the incumbent 
management. 
Weisbach (1988) defines forced turnover as a turnover of other reasons than normal 
retirement. Unfortunately, the identification of forced turnover is difficult because press 
releases often do not describe them as such.  Poor performance is the most frequent 
used reason to determine forced turnover. Generally, forced turnover can be divided 
into two, which are board-initiated and manager-initiated turnovers. Market acts 
differently to turnovers initiated by boards as compared to turnovers initiated by 
managers (Furtado & Karan, 1990).  Friedman and Singh (1989) discuss that board-
initiated successions are more likely to occur under the conditions of poor performance. 
In a rational selection process has occurred, an appropriate change in company‟s 
direction is signalled. Thus, a positive stock market reaction is expected for board-
initiated succession. On the other hand, board-initiated succession is not likely to occur 
in high performing firms. If the situation exists, it will signal that some internal political 
turmoil exists in the company, not the failure of CEO in performing his duty. Therefore, 
board-initiated performance is unwelcomed in high performing firms.  
The second type of forced turnover is CEO-initiated succession. Examples of CEO-
initiated successions are the illness or death of the CEO. Friedman and Singh (1989) 
predict that the CEO-initiated turnover will have a positive market reaction but at the 
level lower than board initiated turnover. Meanwhile, when a firm‟s pre-succession 
performance is good, the CEO-initiated turnover will either signal that the CEO wishes 
to change organizational affiliation or positions available in the external market. A 
negative market reaction is expected due to unwelcome change and disruptions in 
external relations and patterns of authority initiated in the departing CEO‟s interest. 
As forced turnover is commonly related with poor performance, this study expects that 
CEO in poor performing firms who might facing forced turnover, tend to manage 
company performance before they being sacks by the board of directors. They may 
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restate financial statement to show their effectiveness in managing the company for 
their job security. 
  H4:  Firm with CEOs’ forced turnover  will be more likely involved with  
                  financial restatement. 
 
2.2.5 Control Variables 
Firm size, firm leverage, Big 4, family business, market to book value and return on total 
assets are among potential firm characteristics that may play important roles in 
assessing the decision of CEO turnover. Firm size is measured as natural log of book 
value over total assets and leverage is defined as the book value of long-term debt 
divided by total assets. Big 4 is referred to auditor companies that audited firms financial 
statement, namely Ernst & Young (EY), PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG and 
Deloitte. Family business is measured based on shares that are owned by family 
directors. Market to book value ratio indicates the growth of the firms and ROA is a 
measurement for firm‟s accounting performance. 
 
3.0  The Methodology and Model  
Data on CEO turnover, CEO characteristics and financial restatement are gathered from 
company annual reports and Bursa Malaysia‟s website under the company 
announcement section, while data for corporate performance is gathered from 
Datastream.  The unit of analysis for this study is individual CEO turnover in Malaysian 
PLCs. The population of this research comprises of companies that are traded and 
listed on the Main Board and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia including both good and 
low performing firms during the four year interval starting from year 2008 to year 
2010.There were 101 cases of CEO turnover during the period. However, after omitting 
companies with incomplete financial data and delisted companies, we finally ended up 
with 78 turnover events. The following table describes the sample based on its industry 
classification. 
Table 1: Industry Classification 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Industrial products 19 24.4 
Trading/services 19 24.4 
Properties 12 15.4 
Consumer Products 9 11.5 
Technology 9 11.5 
Construction 6 7.7 
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IPC 2 2.6 
Finance 1 1.3 
Plantation 1 1.3 
Total 78 100 
 
Table 1 explains that 48.8 percent of CEOs turnover cases come from industrial product 
and trading/services industries. Both industries are consider as homogenous industry 
and do not depend much on research and development (R&D) and capital spending. As 
a result, due to less complexity in such industries, many suitable candidates can be 
found inside or outside of the firm. Further, in highly competitive industries that consist 
of a large number of homogeneous firms, there is a large pool of suitable CEOs 
candidates compared to a low competition industry. This is because CEO candidates of 
the former face similar working task and environment (DeFond & Park, 1999). In 
addition, Parrino (1997) claims that the cost of human specific capital of outside 
successor in industries comprised of similar firms (homogeneous) is lower than in 
heterogeneous industries. The reason is that the outsider in a homogenous industry 
better understands the production technologies employed at other industry firms and the 
product markets in which they compete. 
CEO turnover is determined by comparing the names of CEOs listed in year 2007 with 
the CEO names in years 2009 and 2010. If there are any changes in the CEO name 
from the based year, then CEO turnover is considered has taken place. Later, the name 
of changed CEO is compared with the announcement made by the company under the 
section of Change in Boardroom in the Bursa Malaysia‟s website. The purpose of 
comparing information gathered from the annual reports and company announcement is 
to ensure that CEO turnover has actually taken place. Some difficulties arise in 
comparing the data since there is no specific announcement made regarding CEO 
change. All changes in company top management including the Chairmen, CEO and 
other directors are lumped together under Change in Boardroom title. From 2008 to 
2010 there were 24700 announcements regarding change in boardrooms. As there is 
no specific announcement made regarding CEO change, every single announcement 
was analysed to differentiate between CEO, chairman or other directors‟ change. Other 
information disclosed in Change in Boardroom announcement includes date of CEO 
change, announcement date, CEO profiles and reason for change. The information is 
relevant to determine the exact date of turnover and the type of CEO turnover.  
 To determine the type of CEO turnover, a further step was taken by examining the 
announcement made by the company regarding CEO turnover.  Based on the reasons 
disclosed on the announcements, turnover events are classified as voluntary or forced 
turnover. Succession theory suggests that there are at least four voluntary scenarios, 
namely relay succession, normal retirement, early retirement and death or poor health 
(Friedman & Singh, 1989; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). A relay succession is when the 
apparent heir becomes the CEO and the outgoing CEO becomes the chairperson.  
Normal retirement is when the CEO retires due to their retirement age. For example, the 
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age of 55 is considered as a retirement age in the UK while in Malaysia, a person 
should seek annual approval when he reaches the age of 70 years old (Goyal & Park, 
2002; Kang, 2002). Early retirement is when the CEO relinquishes his directorship but 
not his officership and his age should be less than the retirement age. Death or poor 
health condition of a CEO is also considered as voluntary turnover.   
Regarding forced turnover, Dahya et al. (2002) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino 
(2004) identify forced turnover by examining the report released by the press including 
the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. They labelled turnover as a forced turnover 
when the news articles state that the executive was “fired” or “resigned” and in both 
cases the CEO must be less than 55 years old. In addition, if the announcement did not 
report any reason for the departure as death, poor health, or the acceptance of other 
position elsewhere or within the firm stated, then the departure is also classified as 
forced turnover.  Further, removal is also considered as forced turnover since CEOs are 
removed before the expiration of their three years term (Kang, 2002). For the purpose of 
this study, classification of forced turnover and voluntary turnover will be based on the 
reason stated in the change of management announcement made by a company on the 
Bursa Malaysia‟s website. The classification used is as suggested by Huson et al. 
(2004) and Dahya et al. (2002). A dummy variable is used to determine turnover type; 
“1” is for forced turnover and “0” is for voluntary turnover. 
The research model of this study is: 
 P(RESTATEMENT=1) =ƒ (CEO Characteristics, control variables) 
where the dependent variable: P(Restatement=1) is the estimated conditional 
probability of financial statement restatement and the independent variables are: 
RESTATEMENT =  Equal „1‟ if firm published restatement annual report.  
  CEOAGE       = Age of CEO during the year preceding CEO turnover 
CEOTENURE     = Number of month the CEO had held the position as at the    
                                            year of the turnover year. 
CEOOWN       = Percentage of shares owned by CEO during the year   
                                            preceding  CEO turnover. 
     CEOOWN2      = CEO ownership square 
FORCED           = Turnover type is determined based on the announcements 
made   by the companies regarding CEO turnover (Dahya et 
al. 2002;  Huson et al. 2004). Variable takes a value of „1‟  
for forced turnover, and „0‟ for voluntary turnover. 
 LNTA                = Natural log of total assets. 
LEV      = Total debt/ total assets. 
B4                = The big four audit firms (EY, PwC, KPMG, Deloitte) 
 FAMBIZ     = Equals „1‟ if family directors have more than 5% shares in  
                                             a company. 
 MTBV      = The ratio of market value to the book value of company  
    assets 
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 ROA                  = The ratio of accounting earnings before interest and taxes to 
the book value of assets. 
 
To estimates this model, logistic regression is used due to the binary nature of 
the dependent variable that violates the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression assumptions. The dependent variable for financial restatement model 
is dichotomous; „1‟ represents firms that restate their financial restatement within 
a year or two years  cases prior to CEO turnover and „0‟ represents non-financial 
restatement cases. 
 
4.0  Results and Discussion 
From 95 companies, 78 companies are included in the analysis after excluding 
incomplete data due to change of financial year and delisting exercises. Table 2 
displays the descriptive statistics for both continuous and dichotomous variables.  22 
companies restated (R sub-sample) their financial statements and 56 companies (NR 
subsample) issued non-restated financial statements.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistic 
Variables Min max Mean  s.d. Median Mean t-test1 
R NR 
RESTATE 0 1 0.28 0.453 0.00 n.a n.a. n.a. 
CEOAGE 34 76 52.18 8.379 52 53.730 51.570 1.023 
CEOTENURE 1 32 7.63 6.866 5.500 6.820 7.950 -0.651 
CEOOWN 0.000 57.490 13.039 16.077 3.810 11.372 13.695 -0.572 
FORCED 0.00 1 0.6154 0.489 1 0.682 0.589 0.749 
LNTA 8.890 17.530 12.825 1.893 12.533 13.427 12.588 *1.786 
LEV 0.00 64.880 1.316 7.299 0.473 0.444 1.658 -0.658 
B4 0 1 0.55 0.501 1 0.450 0.590 -1.071 
FAMBIZ 0 1 0.37 0.486 0 0.410 0.360 0.422 
ROA -64.020 52.830 0.098 13.795 2.520 4.374 -1.581 *1.738 
MTBV 0.150 27.820 1.396 3.417 0.755 2.957 .782 ***2.625 
1T-test is based on 22 restated companies and 56 non-restated companies 
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Our findings suggest that in the sample of companies with CEO turnover from 2008-
2010, about 28% (22 companies out of 78 companies) restated their financial statement 
one year prior to CEO departure. On average, the CEO is in their 50s (almost half of the 
sample or 35 companies) with an average tenure of about 8 years (about 11 companies 
have short-tenured CEO of less than three years of service). Only 8 companies 
appointed the CEO below 40 years old in our CEO turnover sample which represent a 
minority (result is untabulated).  
We also document that on average the CEOs own substantial shareholdings although 
the median value is lower but it is still not a negligible value. Such CEO holds huge 
voting rights and it is natural to expect that these high holding CEOs may pass the 
baton to other CEOs while they retain their board membership perhaps in a more 
“advisory” position such as chairman or vice chairman for example Genting Group 
Berhad as Tan Sri Lim Goh Thong became chairman for the group while his son 
replaced him as a CEO. The companies were not in huge debt or experiencing severe 
losses and with market value higher than book value which is expected from public 
listed companies. The evidence also points towards more forced CEO turnover 
compared to voluntary turnover. About more than a third were family controlled firms 
which are also as expected from Malaysian market. 
Our results also suggest that restated companies are bigger in size (LNTA), are more 
profitable (ROA) and have higher market to book value (MTBV) than non-restated 
companies based on t-test. These should not be overly emphasized as it is not based 
on ceteris paribus basis. 
Table 3 presents the correlation analysis. The evidence suggests that on correlation 
basis, restatement is only significantly associated with market to book value but none 
with the hypotheses variables. However, this should not be overly emphasized. Older 
CEO is associated with longer tenured CEO and lower forced CEO turnover (the 
highest correlation with p=-.787). Longer tenured CEO is associated with higher CEO 
shareholdings and lower forced CEO turnover. Higher CEO ownership is associated 
with smaller companies. None of the correlation is too high to suggest severe 
collinearity threats (see Nunally, 1978).  
In addition, a formal test using Variance Inflation Factor yields results ranging from 
1.144 (FAMBIZ) to 2.897 (CEOAGE). As such, serious threats of multicollinearity are 
not apparent for the chosen research model and the collected data (see Neter, 
Wasserman &Kutner , 1989). 
Firm size has three significant correlations with employing the Big Five auditor, with 
lesser family business and higher profitability. The Big Four auditor is associated with 
profitable companies. Family business is associated with less profitable companies and 
profitable companies are associated with higher market to book value which is 
expected. 
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Table 3:  Correlation Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.RESTATE 1 0.117 -0.074 -0.605 0.201 -0.075 -0.122 0.048 0.196 0.288* 0.086 
2.CEOAGE  1 0.391** 0.034 0.132 -0.151 0.050 0.105 0.068 -0.051 -0.787** 
3.TENURE   1 0.355** -0.036 0.004 0.068 0.030 -0.008 -0.116 -0.348** 
4. CEOOWN    1 -0.327** -0.100 -0.173 0.166 -0.116 -0.181 0.074 
5.LNTA     1 -0.192 0.389** -0.246* 0.277* 0.132 -0.090 
6.LEV      1 0.103 -0.087 0.133 0.007 0.087 
7.B4       1 -.0106 0.292** -0.052 -0.024 
8.FAMBIZ        1 -0.224* -.0152 -0.046 
9.ROA         1 0.501** -0.120 
10.MTBV          1 0.012 
11.FORCED           1 
*/** significant at 10%/5% respectively (two-tailed) 
 
Based on the correlation analysis, a simple chain of  argument would be firms with 
financial restatement is correlated with higher market to book value and market to book 
value is correlated with more profitable firms and profitable firms is correlated with the 
Big Five auditor and non-family business. Non family firms are usually larger and are 
correlated with lower CEO ownership. Lower CEO ownership is correlated with shorter 
tenure which leads to younger CEO.  
Results from the logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 4. Results from 
Panel A (without hypotheses variables) are qualitatively similar with Panel B and C 
saves for leverage. Panel B (without CEOOWN2) shows that from three hypotheses 
variables, only CEOAGE is significant at 1% level. This suggests that older CEOs have 
higher probability of restating restatement prior to CEO turnover year or increase the 
odd of restatement by 41% on average. As the median age from our descriptive results 
is 52 years old which is about three years prior to retirement, we argue that the age 
group of CEO of between 50-55 represents a critical group of near retirement group. 
These CEOs may have to tread carefully between maintaining their reputation in the 
labour market or pressing for the last bonus/pay they would likely receive. Thus, we 
expect these CEOs would be more conservative and might avoid unnecessary 
restatement prior to CEO turnover. This preconceived idea is not supported from the 
finding. It seems that the finding suggests otherwise. An alternative view is that financial 
restatement may not necessarily be a bad thing to be reported if it is as required by the 
relevant FRSs although this speculation is not yet to be tested from our study. 
As findings are not as expected, we conducted a sensitivity analysis and result is as 
displayed in Panel C. Panel C reports that CEO ownership is significant when we 
assume that ownership has a curvilinear effect on odd-likelihood of restatement (at 20% 
ownership level based on the result) similar to findings in other area e.g. firm 
performance and employee ownership (Gudri & Hollandtz, 2008; Kim, Kitsabunnarat & 
Nofsinger, 2004).Our sample includes many companies with CEO ownership exceeding 
the 20% threshold. As such, as CEO ownership gets bigger, the odd-likelihood of 
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restatement falls. Arguably, the management entrenchment hypothesis works in the 
background of such phenomena as the incumbent CEO would have conflict of interests 
and as such would be hesitant to restate previous financial statements. Introducing a 
proxy for management entrenchment also change the original direction of forced CEO 
turnover from positive to negative as theorized. As such, Panel B may suffer from 
omitted variable bias due to entrenchment hypothesis. As expected, these results have 
little similarities with the T-test in Table 2 save for size (LNTA) and market to book value 
(MTBV) as T-test is not on ceteris paribus basis. 
Table 4: Logistic Regression 























 - - -0.004* 
(0.003) 














































Cox & Snell R2  0.242 0.411 0.427 
Correct 
prediction 
 80.8% 82.1% 83.3% 
***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% respectively (2-tailed) 
 
 
Interestingly, if the outgoing CEOs are forced to leave the company, then we could 
observe a much lower probability of financial restatement. This contradicts our 
expectation as we assume that the outgoing CEOs would somehow leave the best 
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results prior to turnover year unless the majority of them did not expect to be unseated 
or had little control on financial and accounting matters where the board of such 
companies may exert bigger control compared to the outgoing CEO. This speculation is 
also yet to be tested from the study. However, our Panel C shows that the direction is 
as expected as we suspect omitted variable bias exists in Panel B. Thus, Panel C 
suggests that forced turnover increases the likelihood of restatement. 
We also find that the bigger the company, the higher probability it would restate its 
financial statement prior to CEO departure year. The study finds that some evidence to 
support the argument of debt as a monitoring cost as debt is argued to constraint 
opportunistic earnings management behavior since it limits the amount of funds or free 
cash flows. Despite that we expect that the Big Four audit firms would promote their 
clients to adopt new FRSs early so that this would lead to less restatement later as 
recently documented in Huang, Zhang, Shen and Xie (2011) in China, the evidence 
suggest that having Big Four auditors is associated with higher probability of 
restatement after controlling other factors. As such, early adoption may not take place 
as market wide phenomena in Malaysia and thus yield a simple explanation that Big 
Four is associated with higher earnings quality by signing off financial restatement when 
the needs arise. 
A more puzzling issue is the effect of family business on financial restatement. We 
document that the effect is significant and positive. As family business is argued to be 
conservative in its business dealings and thus leads to lower financial restatement 
incidence, however it is not evident from the finding. 
We could not find evidence that financial restatement is induced by profitability although 
the direction is as expected as shown under Panel B and C. However, the higher the 
market to book value, the higher the probability of financial restatement as also 
documented in the correlation analysis in Table 3.  
In conclusion, we find supports for H3 (CEO ownership) and H4 (forced turnover). 
Meanwhile, we find the need to reinterpret our expectation of H1 (CEO age) as it is 
counterintuitive. 
 
5.0  Conclusion 
 
The study investigates possible ramifications of outgoing CEO characteristics on 
financial restatement in Malaysia from 2008 to 2010. We find that the age of the CEO 
influence restatement in the year prior to CEO turnover. The older CEOs might not be 
perturbed with the complexities of newer financial accounting standard requirements 
which lead to future restatements as they are from the era of simpler accounting regime 
prior to FRS, or it could be that these restatements might not be bad after all. We have 
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not discounted the possibility that older CEOs are safer from forced turnover as shown 
from correlation analysis. The policy to align CEO‟s interest with the shareholders would 
jeopardize shareholder‟s wealth as the financial information is distorted by such CEOs 
as they would be less likely to restate financial information.  
We take cognizant that our financial restatement samples include both errors and 
changes to accounting policies as each situation could be different. The former may be 
more related to malice intention from the CEOs to mislead the shareholders through 
accounting trickeries and the later might be more related towards malice intention 
through suppressing accounting changes to later period. However, both arguments are 
hard to prove.  
Future study could make use information on restatement due to changes accounting 
standards or errors and omissions. This would affect policy making especially from the 
SC and other regulators. From political economy perspective, more studies on family 
business and restatement would shed some lights to the puzzling evidence we 
documented in this study. 
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